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Flow of new information is what produces price changes, understanding if the market is 
unbalanced is fundamental to know how much inventory market makers should keep during an 
important economic release. 
After identifying which economic indicators impact the S&P and 10 year Treasuries. The 
Volume Synchronized Probability of Information-Based Trading (VPIN) will be used as a 
predictability measure. The results point to some predictability power over economic surprises 
of the VPIN metric, mainly when calculated using the S&P. This finding appears to be 
supported when analysing depth imbalance before economic releases. Inferior results were 
achieved when using treasuries.  
The final aim of this study is to fill the gap between microstructural changes and 
macroeconomic events. 
 

















1. Introduction & Literature Review 
The aim of this study is to understand if microstructural changes in specific assets before 
Macroeconomic data releases have predictive properties over the result of the release, mainly 
if they are able to predict positive or negative surprises. 
The study starts by understanding which macroeconomic announcements produce a 
stronger impact on the financial markets. Subsequently, focusing on those announcements, 
predictability tools to forecast if the results deviate from the expectation are developed. Lastly, 
with all the knowledge acquired an investment strategy is developed. 
The motivation for this study is to fill in the gap between the studies of informed trading 
and its applicability to days with macroeconomic releases. The reason why this study is focused 
on United States macroeconomic events is due to their importance across the globe as a gauge 
to measure the wealth of the financial markets as well as the current Monetary Cycle. As Europe 
and most of the developed countries are following some sort of Quantitative Easing, 
expansionist policies might bias the results of the data releases. Moreover, the Federal Open 
Market Committee, section of the United States Federal Reserve that decides the monetary 
policy to be followed, is constantly monitoring the employment, nonfarm payroll and other 
macroeconomic data, making the data releases so important to signal the monetary policy. 
In the financial markets, price changes are usually driven by flow of information. Easley et 
al. (1992) discovered that an increased inflow of new information reduces the time between 
trades, and the more relevant the news the more volatility it attracts. For this reason, there has 
been a number of studies that try to identify informed traders. The concept of informed traders 
might be misinterpreted as traders with inside information. However, that would be a 
misspecification. Bouchaud et al. (2009), developed an interesting definition of informed trader 
as a trader that is able to earn profit above transaction costs. It is clear that this definition does 
not imply the presence of inside information. 
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In this case, an informed trader might be someone who is able to better interpret economic 
news and generate profit from it. Cenesizoglu, Dionne & Xiaozhou (2014), showed that 
between the release of economic surveys and announcements there is still a significant flow of 
information that can be used by traders. Another evidence of informed trading would be the 
Flash Crash of 6 May 2010. This events make it imperative to try and predict informed trading. 
The increasing number of studies that conclude that economic surprises produce an impact 
on several different assets is what motivates this study. Amongst others, Balduzzi et al. (2001), 
try to understand the impact that economic releases have on US Treasuries. Using the 
microstructure properties of the Bond market, such as trading volume, bid-ask depth and its 
spread. They found that public news explains a substantial amount of the volatility that follows 
the announcement and that adjustments are usually corrected within one minute. This analysis 
was done to four tenors, 3 months, 2, 10 and 30 years. Even though there are indicators that 
impact all the maturities almost evenly it is clear that the largest the maturity the largest the 
impact. Reason why in this study a longer maturity is evaluated. 
Andersen et al. (2002) connect high-frequency dynamics to fundaments by concluding that 
many U.S. announcement surprises produce conditional mean jumps on exchange rates. 
Moreover, they found that there is an asymmetric impact of news; bad news seems to have a 
stronger impact compared to good news. This conclusion is interesting, as throughout this study 
the model appears to have a stronger explanatory power over bad news rather than good news.  
This paper relates to these previous studies in some interesting points, but it also deviates 
in relevant aspects. Both Andersen et al. (2002) and Balduzzi et al. (2001) appear to arrive to 
the conclusion that macroeconomic announcement such as payrolls, employment and durable 
goods produce the largest significant impact on the price of exchange rates and bond markets. 
Despite finding most of the same announcements relevant, it also finds that Retail Sales and 
Manufacturing PMIs, amongst the announcements with the highest impact; however, the 
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explanatory power seems to be relatively lower than the referenced studies. Opposite to most 
studies, the aim is to go further and to try and connect order flow to predict news.  
Although there is substantial literature about the impact of macroeconomic news to 
microeconomic aspects of several assets, mainly Treasuries and Exchange Rates. Few studies 
try to predict the macroeconomic release. Rime, et al. (2010) gives a step in this direction, 
finding tools to predict movements in the exchange rates. Using the data of one year for 3 major 
exchanges, they find evidence to support order flow as a predictor of daily movements in 
exchange rates. Moreover, Pasquariello & Vega (2006) analyse the impact of private and public 
information in the price formation of U.S. Treasuries. They conclude that unexpected order 
flow leads to persistent changes in U.S. Bond prices both in days with and without economic 
releases. Also, the study reveals that the correlation between order flow and price changes is 
the highest when beliefs are dispersed and public announcements are noisy. Meaning, that the 
existence of several different beliefs is what seems to make the order flow central to price 
formation. Following the same line of Pasqiariello et al. (2006), days without relevant economic 
events are set as the benchmark. Understanding in which microstructural aspect does days with 
economic releases deviate from days without relevant announcements will help the 
development of the predictability tools.  
Throughout this work order flow will be evaluated as a predictability tool. This study will 
use the Volume Synchronised Probability of Informed Trading (VPIN), developed by Easley, 
López and O’Hara (2010) as the central model to try and predict economic surprises. 
The choice of this model fits the new developments in the financial markets, where almost 
all assets are exclusively traded through electronic platforms. High-frequency trading has 
become a considerable portion of the financial markets. The Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 2014 compiled a series of studies regarding HFT, where they conclude that the 
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average research found that more than 50% of the total volume of the US equities are HFT. It 
is assumed that for the Futures market this value is even greater. 
This study will focus on order imbalances. When the order flow is unbalanced, market 
makers might be adversely selected and face possible losses. They try to predict order toxicity 
in order to manage their inventory position. Orders were defined by Easley et al. (1996) as 
“toxic when they adversely select market makers, who may be unware that are providing 
liquidity at a loss”. If the market makers believe that the flow toxicity present in the market is 
too strong, they will liquidate their positions. This process usually happens before relevant 
macroeconomic announcements, liquidity disappears from the market as liquidity providers are 
unsure if there are traders with more information than them. 
Furthermore, the motivation to use this model relates to the fact that several studies have 
found that the VPIN could be used as a predictability tool of large movements in the financial 
markets, such as the flash crash. Easley et al. (2011). By analysing the S&P future contract, 
they found evidence that minutes before the Flash Crash, the VPIN metric reached the highest 
level in the history of the contract. Finally, in the same study they compare the VPIN to the 
VIX as predictability measures. They found that although the VIX increased before the crash it 
only reached its pick after the market collapsed. So, it is possible to conclude that the VIX was 
impacted by the flash crash producing no explanatory power over it, whereas the VPIN 
appeared to have some predictability information. 
The VPIN metric departures from the Probability of Information-Based Trading (PIN) 
Model developed by Easley et al. (1996). This metric follows the basic principle that trading is 
an exchange between liquidity providers and position takers. 
The PIN model has a few drawbacks for the dataset that is going to be used. Firstly, the PIN 
model is a daily measure of Probability of Informed Trading. Since macroeconomic releases 
occur throughout the day, only the hours around economic releases will be studied to understand 
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if they provide some predictive power. Moreover, by using high-frequency data, the trading 
time is not continuous, as there are seconds with a large flow of orders and others where there 
are no trades at all. For this reason, the VPIN model will be studied, as it is not only able to 
analyse high-frequency data, but also is able to divide the sample in time volume buckets. Ané 
& German (2000) had already developed this method that defines trade time as volume 
increments. The concept of volume time bucket is explained further. Another reason why the 
volume buckets are so appropriate for this type of data is that it is able to deal with volatility 
clustering that is a characteristic of high frequency data. Thus, as significant movements in 
price are usually attached to increasing trading volumes, it is a way to sample by volatility, 
normalize and reduce heteroscedasticity. 
The main focus of this study is to use the VPIN as the main predictability measure of 
economic data releases; however, other microstructure properties such as the depth of the first 
level of the order book and bid/ask spread might have predictability information.  
Several studies analyse bid-ask metrics, such as the bid-ask depth imbalance and spread; 
these metrics serve as a liquidity and predictability proxies. Rühl & Stein (2014), concluded 
that the bid-ask spread has two components, volatility (measures risk) and information 
component (predictability element). Zheng, Moulines, & Abergel (2013), concluded that the 
conditional probability of the next trade sign is severely correlated with a bid-ask depth 
imbalance metric. In this study the depth imbalance (DI) will be evaluated in order to see if 
combined with OI creates an improved predictability tool. Xu, J., (2013) defines DI as a metric 
that is able to capture the liquidity pressures of the limit order book, the same DI metric will be 
used in this study; Zhan, et al. (2008) highlight possible drawbacks of the DI metric; in their 
study they conclude that the bid ask depth reflects the liquidity that marker makers are willing 
to provide after taking into account the market order flow. This conclusion might indicate that 
the addition of information contained in the DI is already accounted in the OI. 
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The remainder of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data set; section 
3 describes the methodology, first for the selection of the major economic events, later the 
model to predict surprises. Section 4 provides the results and discussion. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Data 
The data used for the expected and realized value of the macroeconomic data was provided 
by Bloomberg. The forecasts correspond to the median of all the predictions attained by 
Bloomberg. Time table 1 highlights the time of the announcements. 
Figure 1: Time of economic releases (GMT) 
 
For the initial analysis of the impact of surprises on prices of the S&P Future and 10 year 
Treasuries, minute bar data will be used. For the S&P 500 the data set starts on the 30th of 
September 2007. Whereas, the Treasury data starts on the 10th of June of the same year. They 
both end in the end of March 2015. Tick data is used for the subsequent analysis. 
Tick data displays the information of transaction volume and price, best bid and depth, best 
ask and depth to the closest second. The sample covers the period from 3rd of April 2015, until 
the 23rd of November from 7am until 12am EST time, as most economic releases occur between 
8 and 10am. The tenor chosen for the U.S. Treasuries was 10 years because it is the one that 
combines both highest duration with highest liquidity, prevailing above 5 year and ultra-bonds. 
Lastly, the available data was divided in two. From the 3rd of April until the 31st of August 
an in-sample analysis is produced (referenced as in-sample data). From the 1st of September 
onwards the data will be used to test all the knowledge acquired (out-of-sample data). 
3. Methodology 
Firstly, to try and predict announcement news, one must understand which news have the 
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comparable, the same methodology of Balduzzi et al. (2001) and Andersen et al. (2002) is used 
in order to standardize news. The surprise for each k indicator at time t is divided by its sample 




                                                                (1) 
where 𝐴𝑘𝑡  represents the value of the economic indicator k at time t, 𝐸𝑘𝑡 corresponds to the 
median of the predicted values, and 𝜎?̂? is the sample standard deviation of the difference 
between actual value and predicted. Contrasting both referenced studies, the standard deviation 
is calculated in a rolling basis, using the past 20 days. This was done so that the standard 
deviation does not include forward looking information and so it does not incorporate 
completely different economic cycles that could produce a bias to this metric.  
In order to assess the impact of economic surprises on the price on the future of the S&P500 
and on the 10 year U.S. Treasuries, this simple OLS regression was computed 
∆𝑃𝑡−1:𝑡+𝑥,𝑘 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑆𝑘𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡                                                   (2) 
where ∆𝑃𝑡−1:𝑡+𝑥,𝑘 corresponds to the price change of each asset between the end of the minute 
prior to the announcement until 1, 5,15 and 60 minutes after for the kth indicator (k=1,...,14).  
Andersen et al. (2002) simply defined VPIN as the rolling average of the absolute Order 
Imbalances. In spite of this simple definition, several steps must be taken, illustrated below. 
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Tick data provides granular information on trades, changes in bid-ask price and depth. 
Nevertheless, there are also some drawbacks from using this type of data. Tick data captures 
each trade and each change on bid-ask, which means that it is not a stationary series. There are 
seconds/minutes with much higher market flow than others, making them incomparable. For 
this reason, a different time metric is computed – volume buckets. Allowing for this change 
enables comparisons between buckets within one day or even between different days. To 
construct volume buckets, it is necessary to decide how to divide each day. In this case the 
future of the S&P has an average morning volume of 554,718.01. In order to divide each 
morning in 40 intervals (# buckets per morning = B), each bucket of time should have on 
average 13,868 trades. In the case of the 10 year treasury futures with an average morning 
volume of 441,393.93, each morning will be divided on average in 15 buckers, each having an 
average volume of 29,426 trades. The value of B will be explained further in the results section. 
Identical to previous VPIN studies, the average volume of trades during the morning is the 
average over the whole in-sample period. Subsequently, this methodology leads to a forward 
looking bias in-sample. Nevertheless, all these values will be used to calculate the VPIN out-
of-sample. A rolling window would not be appropriate in this case, as the objective is to 
compare each trading volume to a consistent metric. Even though there are month with much 
lower trading volume, like June in the case of the Treasuries, this does not necessarily mean 
lower probability of informed traders in a specific time frame. The summary of this analysis 
can be seen in appendix 3. Just like in Andersen et al. (2013), these graphs highlight the need 
to “detrend” the volume of trades to make them comparable. 
When trading intensity increases, the time to fill in a volume bucket is lower than when 
trading is slow. This is why volume buckets provide such a good comparison tool. 
After dividing the sample in volume buckets it is necessary to understand which trades are 
buyer or seller initiated. There has been an increasing amount of discussion on this topic. 
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Chakrabarty et al. (2014) presents an interesting discussion about the best methodology to 
classify trades, comparing the Bulk Volume Classification (BVC), used in this paper with the 
tick rule (TR) and Lee-Ready (LR) algorithm. In their study they compare the real trade 
classification provided by the NASDAQ Exchange with these metrics. They conclude that on 
the majority of the tests, the BVC classification is outperformed by the other. Nevertheless, the 
LR procedures is only reliable if level II information (order book data) mid quote is available 
and is reliable, as tick data is used the most appropriate method to classify trades will either be 
the same used by Easley et al. (2012) and Abad, D., and Yagüe, J., (2012), the BVC or the tick 
rule. Both methods will be tested, and ultimately, the one that appears to better explain surprises 
will be used. The TR is the simplest classification method, it classifies a trade as buyer-initiated 
if the current trade price is above the prior, and seller-initiated if it is below. If between two 
trades the price does not change, the classification will be the same as the previous. 
On the other hand, to proceed with the BVC method, trades are aggregated over short 
periods, one minute intervals (in this case), then the standardized price change between the 
beginning and end of each interval is used to determinate the percentage of buy and sell orders. 
Using the same variables as Easley et al. (2012), the buy (𝑉𝑖
𝐵) and sell (𝑉𝑖
𝑆) are calculated as 
𝑉𝑖
𝐵 = 𝑉𝑖 ∙ 𝑍 (
𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑖−1
𝜎∆𝑃
)                                                       (3) 
𝑉𝑖
𝑆 = 𝑉𝑖 ∙ [1 − 𝑍 (
𝑃𝑖−𝑃𝑖−1
𝜎∆𝑃
) ] =   𝑉 − 𝑉𝑖
𝐵                                         (4) 
where 𝑉𝑖 is the volume traded in the time period 𝑖 − 1 to 𝑖. 𝑃𝑖 − 𝑃𝑖−1 is the price change between 
that period, 𝜎∆𝑃 is the estimate standard deviation of price over in-sample. Z is the CDF of the 
standard normal distribution. This method divides the trade between buyer and seller initiated, 
if there is no price change the volume is equally divided. If the price increases, the volume is 
mainly transferred to the buy rather than the sell; the opposite if price decreases. 




𝐵 = ∑ 𝑉𝑖
𝐵𝑡(𝜏)
𝑖=𝑡(𝜏−1)+1 ;        𝑉𝜏
𝑆 = ∑ 𝑉𝑖
𝑆𝑡(𝜏)
𝑖=𝑡(𝜏−1)+1                               (5)(6) 
where, 𝜏 corresponds to a bucket and t(𝜏 − 1) is the minute of the start of the bucket, and 𝑡(𝜏) 
the last minute of bucket 𝜏. 
The final step before calculating the VPIN, is to compute the order imbalance (OI) of each 
volume bucket, which is simply the absolute difference between the buy and sell volume. It can 
be mathematically expressed as 
𝑂𝐼𝜏 = |𝑉𝜏
𝐵 − 𝑉𝜏
𝑆|                                                         (7) 
Finally, to calculate the VPIN metric it is necessary to combine the order imbalance with 
the average trade volume during the morning and with the span that the VPIN metric is going 











                                            (8) 
Through this expression it is possible to understand that the VPIN metric is recalculated 
after each bucket and it only starts in the nth bucket. If n was equal to B (number of buckets per 
day on average), there would be on average one value of VPIN per morning. As the aim of this 
study is to understand the Volume of Informed trading before the announcement, n has to be 
low enough so that on average there are enough buckets filled before the announcement.  
The value of B will differ for Treasuries and for the S&P. Since the volume transacted, the 
type of agents that make up the bulk of the trades and the announcements evaluated for each 
assets differ. B and n will be sets so that each VPIN metric better captures the surprises. The 
results and comparison of several different parameters will be explained further. Nevertheless, 
for the S&P future, n will be set to be equal to 1 and B equal to 40. Making some simple 
calculations, since the analysed period is between 7:30am and 11:30am EST, 4 hours, each 
bucket would capture on average 6 minutes, allowing for 9 values of the VPIN before the 
announcement. In the case of the 10 year Treasuries, B will be set to 15 and n to 1, enabling on 
average 3 values of the VPIN before the earliest announcements. 
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After understanding which announcements to analyse and developing a metric of informed 
trading, a series of comparisons between the benchmark and days with relevant economic 
indicators like the average VPIN value and number of buckets during the day are calculated. 
These are simple metrics but highlight the difference between these days. 
Finally, to try and predict surprises two regressions are analysed. First, to try and understand 
the explanatory power of news the following regression is analysed  
𝑆𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑉𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                (9) 
where, 𝑉𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 is the last value of the VPIN right before the announcement. This means that 
sometimes there will be no value of VPIN before the announcement, if trading intensity was 
low. On the other hand, when there is enough volume before the announcement, the last value 
of VPIN can be calculated only one minute before the announcement or several minutes before. 
This will depend on the amount of volume traded during the morning that will fill in the buckets. 
As there seems to be more explanatory power of the VPIN over negative surprises, a probit 
regression is analysed. The Probit provides some benefits over a normal OLS regression, as it 
tries to identify if the probability of a negative surprise increases with the value of VPIN. The 
regression has the expression below, and the variable will be defined as 0 if the surprise is above 
or equal to zero, and 1 other wise.1 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑉𝑃𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                    (10) 
𝑌𝑡 = {
0       𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑡 ≥ 0
1       𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑡 < 0
 
Using the second portion of the sample, an out of sample investment strategy is developed. 
By analysing the times when VPIN has some explanatory power over economic surprises, a 
threshold is defined, VPIN values above it should lead to negative surprises.  
                                                          
1 In order to decide between a probit and logit, the deviance metric was used. The deviance measures lack of fit, 
which means that a lowest value is preferred. In the case of the S&P the probit deviance was 33.072 and logit 
33.041; for the treasuries was 48.9322 and 48.9468; As these values are so close to each other, both regressions 
appear to fit the data similarly, so it was chosen for simplicity to use the probit metric for both regressions. It is 
important to notice that for both regressions, the conclusions were the same. 
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Through the analysis of which economic announcements produce relevant impact, it is also 
possible to study the magnitude and sign of the impact. The sign will be crucial for the 
examination of the VPIN. If the signal is negative, the value of the standardized surprise will 
be the symmetric of the actual value. And this will substitute the value of 𝑆𝑡 in both equation 
(9) and (10) so that a “positive” new is expected to lead to positive returns. 
Lastly, there are two dimensions that have to be evaluated. The predictive power of this 
methodology and the profitability of this strategy. For the former, the amount of predicted 
surprises over the total amount of announcements will be evaluated. For the latter, a simple 
return measurement of the strategy will be computed. 
The focus of this study is to use the order imbalance, through the VPIN metric, as a 
predictability tool. Nevertheless, other levels of the financial microstructure will be studied to 
try and complement the VPIN. As illustrated in the figure below, whereas, VPIN analyses only 
market orders, DI is able to analyse a deeper level of the limit order book. 
Figure 3:  Difference between OI and DI, development of the DI tool 
 
The same metric developed by Xu (2013) of DI will be used and it is represented below 
𝐷𝐼𝑡 = log(𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡) − log(𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ 𝐵𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡)                      (11) 
Opposite to the order imbalance, where the distribution is standardized by volume, in this 
case the data will be organized to the closest second.  
After developing this additional metric, the same procedure as the one developed for the 
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of this first analysis, an investment strategy will be developed and tested for predictability and 
profitability. When trying to understand the predictability power of the DI, the optimal number 
of seconds before the announcement is going to be evaluated in-sample and tested out of 
sample. Finally, both metrics will be combined in order to see if DI is able to add value to VPIN. 
4. Results and Discussion 
The initial step in this analysis is to identify and prove that it is interesting to predict 
economic surprises as they are predominant for the transfer of news and price formation. 
Regression (2) allows for this analysis. As mentioned in the introduction, this study starts with 
the premise that only flow of new information leads to price changes. Hence, the absolute value 
of the economic news release is irrelevant, only surprise will be studied.  
In order to achieve robust conclusions, regression (2) will be computed for 4 different time 
frames, 1, 5, 15 and 60 minutes. Test in different time spans is fundamental; if the impact of a 
news surprise would happen only in the second after the release and then return to the initial 
value, there would be a great chance that the investor could not be able to sell at the pick/bottom, 
not profiting from knowing the surprise in advance. 
The results are presented in appendix 1 and 2 for the S&P and Treasuries respectively. It is 
interesting to identify that the announcement surprise of some indicators are statistically 
significant for some time frames but stop being for others. This is specially the case for the 
S&P, i.e. Existing Home Sales and Initial Jobless Claims. Furthermore, regarding the S&P, the 
result that stands out the most is the decreasing R2 when the regression is done considering a 
longer time span. As previously mentioned, this initial analysis will allow the division of the 
sample in days with and without relevant economic releases. For the S&P the days with relevant 
economic releases will correspond to the days with ADP+, Durable Goods+, Manufacturing 
PMIs+, Nonfarm+ Payrolls, New One Family Households+ and Retail Sales+ (indicators with 
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highest R2). Neither, Existing Home Sales nor Initial Jobless Claims, will be incorporated in 
this analysis as they combine to the lowest R2, with low significance levels at certain periods. 
For the Treasuries the results are slightly different, not only the announcements that appear 
to have a stronger impact vary, as there appears to exist a greater consistency in all the time 
frames. Hence, the days with relevant economic news will be the days with ADP-, CPI-, GDP-, 
Initial Jobless Claims+, Manufacturing PMIs-, Nonfarm Payrolls-, New One Family 
Households-, New Privately Owned Housing- and Retail Sales-. It is important to notice that 
some of the announcements will have a positive and others negative impact over each asset, 
this is represented by a positive or negative sign over the indicator (+/-). 
Prior to any further analysis it is necessary to look at different results and decide the value 
of the number of buckets per morning (B) and number of buckets to calculate VPIN (n) that 
lead to higher explanatory power (in equation (9)). 
The VPIN metric works best if it is able to capture OI that deviate from the average. There 
has been no particular discussion on the correct value of B, it depends on what is being captured 
and on the trading frequency of each asset. If it is an asset that has a lot of trading volume 
throughout the morning, then B has to be higher. For this reason, the value of B for the S&P is 
higher than the value for the Treasures. Set to 40 and 15 respectively. As the aim of this study 
is to calculate possible small order imbalances that might reflect some information prior 
economic releases, B cannot be so small that is not possible to calculate a VPIN value before 
the economic release or to large that almost each trade is evaluated individually as the 
conclusions would be too unstable. The values were set to better accommodate the data that is 
being evaluated and this was done by regressing equation (9) several times until the best 
explanatory VPIN was reached (Analysis is represented in appendix 5). 
Secondly, the variable that has the largest impact on the VPIN metric, is the value of n. As 
n increases some of the extreme order imbalances that might happened within a bucket can be 
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offset by averaging with the subsequent buckets, this is represented in appendix 3. VPIN will 
follow a log-normal distribution, meaning that the larger the variance the righter skewed will 
the distribution be. Appendix 4 illustrate that, as n decreases the distribution is increasingly 
more skewed, and these are the values that might be able to predict economic releases. Although 
the graphs are relative to the S&P the same applies to the Treasuries. As the purpose of this 
study is to try identify these extreme values and see if they can explain surprises, n should be 
as small as possible, so it is set to 1 in both cases.  
As described above, there are two different metrics to classify trades that are applicable to 
the type of data used. Even though, several studies referenced above conclude that the BVC 
methodology is outperformed by other metrics, it appears that the VPIN metric calculated using 
the BVC metric has a stronger explanatory power over economic surprises. Using the 
parameters stablished before, the VPIN was calculated with both trade classifications. Making 
use of regression (9) it is possible to identify which metric has larger predictive power. As 
represented in appendix 6, the BVC classification appears to have a stronger explanatory power. 
Appendix 7 represent the distributions of both VPIN metrics. It is interesting to notice that 
Treasuries have VPIN spikes throughout the sample it seems that for the S&P they are more 
concentrated in the end period.  
The first analysis is going to evaluate if the VPIN metric is able to identify if days with 
economic releases are days with more informed trading, presented in the table below. 
Table 1: Comparison of the VPIN metric for days with and without relevant economic releases 
    S&P Treasuries 
   Days with Days Without Days with Days Without 











# Buckets 43,37 37,46 25,88 22,84 
Only announcements that 















 Overall, the average of the S&P distribution is higher, which represents that the order 
imbalances are usually stronger. When accounting for all the 14 analysed macroeconomic 
announcements, VPIN identifies on average an increased presence of informed traders than 
during the rest of the days. For the days with the chosen relevant economic announcements, 
this affirmation still holds, the average VPIN of the S&P and Treasuries is still higher than the 
benchmark. This initial conclusion is meaningfully, as it provides support for all the study. 
Providing evidence that during days with relevant economic releases there is a higher presence 
of informed traders. The fact that the average VPIN is higher on the days with relevant 
economic releases implies that the order imbalances throughout these days is higher. Which 
appears to corroborate with past studies of order imbalances as a source of information 
transmission, and crucial for price formation.  
Moreover, days with relevant economic releases have a higher number of buckets that are 
filled. This means that these days attract a larger amount of traders which is interesting by itself 
and proves how relevant would be to predict economic surprises. 
In order to understand if the VPIN has in fact explanatory power, the results of the 
regressions (9) and (10) will be evaluated. 
Table 2: Result of equation (9) and (10) for the VPIN metric 
 Beta SE pValue R2 
S&P -2,10 1,27 11,05% 10,70% 
Treasuries -3,21 1,67 6,16% 8,46% 
 Beta SE pValue R2 
S&P 2,92 2,45 23,36% 4,46% 
Treasuries 7,23 2,4 1,62% 12,34% 
 
The table above represents the results of applying the VPIN to the economic surprises. It is 
interesting to see that, a higher value of VPIN in both seems to imply a future negative surprise. 
It is important to remember that each equation is done with the economic indicators that most 
affect the asset. Moreover, the VPIN metric appears to be statistically significant at 15% in the 
first equation of both assets. These are the most striking results of the paper as there indeed 
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appears to exist evidence, although small (small value of R-squared) that the VPIN metric has 
some explanatory power over future economic indicator releases. 
To take this study even further, as there appears to exist evidence over the explanation of 
negative surprises, the second regression captures this effect. The probability of a negative 
surprise increases with the increase of the VPIN metric calculated for the Treasuries. However, 
the increase probability of negative surprise with increase VPIN of the S&P is not statistically 
significant. Strikingly, out-of-sample the S&P is a better predictor of negative surprises. 
The final step is to identify a profitable investment strategy; the graphs below represent the 
distribution of VPIN to the future economic surprise.  
Table 3: Graphical representation of regression (9) for both assets 
 
For the S&P, values above 0.12 appear to be followed by negative surprises, whereas values 
below this threshold are usually followed by negative surprises. In sample, this threshold would 
have a percentage of correct signals of 73.91%. In the case of the 10 Year Treasuries, values 
above 0.13 appear to be followed by negative surprises and below by positive. Again, this 
threshold would have an accuracy of 65.85% in-sample. Given these results, these will be the 
thresholds analysed for the investment strategy that is developed out of sample. 
These thresholds will be evaluated in two levels, first their predictability power, and 
secondly the profitability of this investment strategy. The first level conclusions are somewhat 
interesting, it seems that with the parameters defined above, the VPIN calculated for the S&P 
would be able to predict the news surprise with a 71.43% accuracy over 14 observations. On 
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the other hand of the scope, the Treasuries VPIN could only predict 56.52% (23 observations). 
A sensitivity analysis of the thresholds is displayed in appendix 8, it appears that the 
predictability power it is stable around these values. The profitability results of this strategy are 
presented below, two scenarios are analysed, if the position is liquidated after 5 or 60 minutes. 
Table 4: Result of the Investment strategy given the specified threshold. In brackets is the Sharpe Ratio. 
 S&P 10 Year Treasuries 
5 min -0,97% (-0,0840) -3,24% (-0,0156) 
1 hour 1,63% (0,2507) 2,03% (0,0401) 
 
For the level of risk that this strategy involves, even the risk reward for the treasuries is not 
substantially high (evaluated by the Sharpe Ratio); however, it is still interesting. Another 
interesting conclusion is that, although the S&P has a higher explanatory power, returns are still 
negative. Meaning that the predictability results should be used as an investment decision in 
other assets that might be influenced by these announcements, i.e. exchange and interest rates. 
To take this analysis further, and as in previous studies such as Easley et al. (2011), 
discovered that the VPIN appears to predict negative events, a new trading strategy is developed 
where the investor only invests if a negative surprise is expected (if VPIN is above the 
threshold). The results are presented in the table below. 
Table 5: Result of the investment strategy of only investing in negative surprises 
 S&P 10 Year Treasuries 
5 min 0,59% (0,0299) -0,08% (-0,0009) 
1 hour 0,55% (0,1043) 0,65% (0,0250) 
% correct 100% 42,86% 
 
Interestingly, there is a 100% accuracy in predicting negative events, using the S&P, and 
returns are positive. The only drawback is that, there were only 4 values above 0.12, making 
this not a robust result. Though, it is curious that whereas the S&P profits and it is better at 
predicting negative surprises, Treasuries profit and predict better positive surprises. 
Finally, the results from equation (9) for the DI analysis in-sample are presented in the table 
below. It is important to notice that even though several studies analyse the bid-ask spread, in 
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this time frame the value before the announcement does not deviate from the average, so it is 
not going to be evaluated. 
Table 6: Result of equation (9) of the DI and evaluation of the metric out of sample 
In-sample Out of sample 
 Beta SE pValue R2 % correct 
S&P 0,17 0,12 17,77% 7,15% 31,25% 
Treasuries -0,14 0,07 6,20% 7,22% 61,29% 
 
Appendix 9 represents a sensitivity analysis of equation (9) when calculated for different 
seconds before the announcement. It is important to take into consideration that the highest R2 
for the S&P was achieved when the variables were calculated 10 seconds before the 
announcement. Whereas for the treasuries the variables were calculated 25 seconds before. The 
most striking finding about these results, is even though the sign of the DI should reflect which 
side of the market is more probable of being depleted first. For the Treasuries, a greater volume 
in the bid side appears to predict a negative surprise. The opposite, more intuitively, happens 
within the S&P market, where a higher volume on the best bid (versus the best ask) appears to 
predict positive surprises. Hence, this might indicate a higher portion of informed traders in the 
S&P before the economic releases when compared to the Treasury traders. However, the S&P 
is only statistically significant at 17.77%. 
Moreover, the predictability results are disappointing and do not appear to add value to the 
VPIN metric. When evaluating the signals, in the S&P, all the announcements except one, that 
the DI predicts so does the VPIN. For the Treasuries, there are some cases that DI correctly 
predicts when VPIN does not, however, the ones that VPIN predict offset that improvement. 
The comparison between signals is represented in appendix 10. Also, it appears that investing 
only when both metrics signal the same result does not improve the results in the S&P (correctly 
predicting only 57,14%), however it appears to slightly improve in the predictability for the 
treasuries (correctly predicting 66,67%). The only drawback is that the investor will most often 




There has been a number of studies that try to identify the impact of economic releases on 
several different assets, ranging from Treasuries, usually appointed as the assets that suffer 
more with changes in economic beliefs; Exchange rates, that similar to Treasuries incorporate 
the interest rate of the country in their pricing, making them exposed to new economic releases. 
And Equities that have a more indirect effect, but transmit the confidence that investors have 
over the overall economy of a country.  
The aim of this study is to take a step further, given that positive and negative economic 
releases have significant impact on the S&P and 10 year Treasuries, the VPIN metric was be 
used to try and predict surprises. The first striking conclusion of this study is that on days with 
relevant economic events the existence of informed traders appears to be higher (higher VPIN). 
It appears to exist evidence that the VPIN has a small explanatory power over the economic 
surprises. Even though, in sample, the S&P has a smaller explanatory power, out of sample it 
appears to be a good predictor, mainly in the case of negative news. This conclusion 
corroborates with previous studies that use the VPIN to predict the flash crash. 
Moreover, it is interesting to notice that opposite to the S&P, Treasuries have a stronger 
explanatory power over positive news rather than negative news. This is interesting, one of the 
reasons might be the fact that usually the aggregate of agents that participate on the treasury 
market are more risk adverse, not wanting to participate when expecting a negative surprise. 
The final conclusion on this initial analysis is that the VPIN calculated relative to the S&P 
appears to have a stronger explanatory power given the chosen threshold, which means that it 
could also be given as a gauge to invest in other assets. 
The poor returns of the S&P might be explained by the fact that, although the number is 
released at the exact time, there are also some specifications that come after the number that 
take longer to be analysed and may lead to a retracement of the price movement.  
23 
 
The final analysis of the bid-ask depth imbalance, is just the begging of a study that can be 
taken much further. Although the results were not enlightening, it was interesting to notice that 
for the S&P, a positive DI would be an indicator of a positive news. Whereas the opposite 
occurs in the Treasuries. This corroborates with the conclusion that the traders of the S&P are 
more informed. 
Moreover, order imbalance appears to have a stronger explanatory power when compared 
to the depth imbalance. This corroborates past studies such as Zheng et al. (2013) where they 
study the long memory of the order flow. The rational is that when a trader resolves to buy/sell 
a considerable quantity of assets he may spit it into small pieces in order not to move the market 
and get a worse average price. Due to this mechanism, several studies recognize that previous 
market orders direction might be able to predict the next market order. This implies that order 
imbalance might have a larger explanatory power when compared to depth imbalance, as the 
first relates to market orders and the second to limit orders. Moreover, Zhan, et al. (2008), 
conclude that the DI captures the information that market makers attain from the order 
imbalance and make a decision to provide liquidity upon. 
Finally, it would be interesting to explore further the bid ask structure of the assets, and be 
able to evaluate deeper limit order levels that might provide useful information. Nevertheless, 
and as concluded in this study it is important to notice that informed traders usually transmit 
new information to the market through market orders whereas limit orders are most often used 
by liquidity providers. This means that order imbalances and metrics that evaluate market orders 
should have a stronger explanatory power.  
All in all, there are some interesting conclusions that open the desire to investigate more 
this subject, more types of assets, more levels of the limit order book, and different OI metrics. 
In 2015 there was also a new development in the VPIN metric advanced by Ke et al. (2015) 
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Appendix 2: Impact of Economic Surprises on the Future of the 10 year Treasuries 
 
Announcement
Beta P-Val R^2 Beta Pval R^2 Beta Pval R^2 Beta Pval R^2
1 - GDP 0,279 0,070 3,57% 0,248 0,237 1,53% -0,267 0,198 1,79% -0,362 0,264 1,35%
Real Activity
2 - Nonfarm Payroll 
Employment
1,672 0,001 11,34% 1,984 0,000 13,23% 1,812 0,001 10,46% 1,410 0,028 5,15%
3 - ADP Employment 
Change
0,568 0,000 17,85% 0,608 0,000 14,58% 0,641 0,002 9,63% 0,915 0,002 10,01%
4 - Initial Jobless 
Claims
-0,342 0,000 5,89% -0,404 0,000 4,32% -0,381 0,003 2,20% -0,162 0,364 0,20%
5 - Retail Sales 0,506 0,009 7,26% 0,701 0,005 8,36% 0,762 0,007 7,67% 0,734 0,035 4,72%
Consumption
6 - Existing Home 
Sales
0,377 0,014 6,48% 0,291 0,225 1,61% 0,205 0,523 0,45% 0,158 0,750 0,11%
7 - New Privately 
Owned Housing
0,034 0,800 0,07% -0,131 0,413 0,73% -0,267 0,198 1,79% -0,362 0,264 1,35%
8 - New One Family 
Houses Sold
0,451 0,004 8,87% 0,581 0,009 7,20% -0,008 0,982 0,00% -0,542 0,245 1,48%
Investment
9 - Durable Goods 
Orders
0,272 0,031 5,13% 0,297 0,091 3,18% 0,315 0,131 2,55% 0,352 0,198 1,86%
10 - ISM 
Manufacturing PMI 
1,394 0,000 27,57% 1,756 0,000 28,48% 1,610 0,000 17,03% 2,371 0,000 19,77%
Net Exports
11 - Trade Balance 0,301 0,045 4,31% 0,236 0,177 1,97% -0,074 0,758 0,10% 0,025 0,955 0,00%
Prices
12 - Consumer Price 
Index
-0,148 0,402 0,76% -0,076 0,739 0,12% -0,082 0,767 0,10% 0,617 0,113 2,71%
13 - Producer Price 
Index
-0,207 0,201 -1,02% -0,303 0,139 -0,35% -0,030 0,906 0,72% 0,076 0,782 0,28%
Sentiment Related
14 - Consumer 
Confidence Index
0,189 0,173 2,03% 0,294 0,163 2,13% 0,236 0,456 0,61% -0,613 0,160 2,16%
1 Minute 5 Minutes 15 Minutes 60 Minutes
Announcement
Beta P-Val R^2 Beta Pval R^2 Beta Pval R^2 Beta Pval R^2
1 - GDP -0,019 0,021 5,87% -0,008 0,465 0,60% -0,009 0,486 0,55% -0,012 0,489 0,54%
Real Activity
2 - Nonfarm Payroll 
Employment
-0,109 0,007 7,99% -0,129 0,002 10,19% -0,138 0,001 12,30% -0,110 0,019 5,99%
3 - ADP Employment 
Change
-0,042 0,000 31,08% -0,057 0,000 31,99% -0,069 0,000 26,31% -0,072 0,000 20,70%
4 - Initial JoblTYs 
Claims
0,015 0,000 4,58% 0,021 0,000 5,17% 0,020 0,001 2,97% 0,023 0,005 1,97%
5 - Retail Sales -0,049 0,000 22,49% -0,062 0,000 19,20% -0,061 0,000 13,68% -0,068 0,004 8,98%
Consumption
6 - Existing Home 
SalTY
-0,006 0,333 1,05% -0,005 0,489 0,54% -0,012 0,230 1,62% -0,001 0,967 0,00%
7 - New Privately 
Owned Housing
-0,014 0,048 4,32% -0,013 0,197 1,87% -0,009 0,486 0,55% -0,012 0,489 0,54%
8 - New One Family 
HousTY Sold
-0,012 0,038 4,76% -0,015 0,034 4,95% -0,010 0,342 1,02% -0,017 0,271 1,36%
InvTYtment
9 - Durable Goods 
Orders
-0,012 0,092 3,16% -0,018 0,044 4,49% -0,009 0,396 0,81% -0,011 0,464 0,60%
10 - ISM 
Manufacturing PMI 
-0,053 0,000 21,82% -0,071 0,000 21,73% -0,088 0,000 24,64% -0,080 0,000 13,52%
Net Exports
11 - Trade Balance -0,005 0,733 0,13% 0,000 0,994 0,00% 0,001 0,959 0,00% -0,026 0,253 1,47%
PricTY
12 - Consumer Price 
Index
-0,025 0,006 8,34% -0,027 0,018 6,12% -0,023 0,067 3,71% -0,015 0,441 0,67%
13 - Producer Price 
Index
-0,011 0,299 3,25% -0,017 0,205 0,76% -0,024 0,187 -0,57% -0,028 0,208 -0,58%
Sentiment Related
14 - Consumer 
Confidence Index
0,001 0,880 0,03% -0,007 0,419 0,74% -0,008 0,486 0,55% -0,002 0,882 0,03%
1 Minute 5 Minutes 15 Minutes 60 Minutes





Appendix 4: VPIN Distribution by changing the number of buckets per day. From left to right and top to bottom, n equal 1, 
10 and 20.  Skew and Kurtosis (1.2222 4.2432) (0.5649 3.2793)  (0.5028 3.2220) respectitively.  
 
 
Appendix 5: Sensitivity Analysis of the value of n for both the S&P and Treasuries 
 
Appendix 6: Results of Regression 9 with different classification method 
 
  
Appendix 3: Daily trading volume vs Average trading S&P and TY Futures 
Appendix 7: Distribution of the VPIN metric, for the S&P and Treasuries 
Beta SE pValue R2
S&P -2,28 1,71 19,48% 7,20%
Treasuries -1,33 1,23 28,79% 2,89%
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Appendix 9: Sensitivity Analysis on the number of seconds before the announcement 
 
Appendix 10: Comparison between real economic surprise and predictions of both metrics 
 
sec' Beta Std Pval R2 sec' Beta Std Pval R2
5 0,01 0,13 95,85% 0,01% 5 -0,04 0,09 62,19% 0,52%
10 0,17 0,12 17,77% 7,15% 10 0,00 0,08 99,43% 0,00%
15 0,08 0,09 40,10% 2,84% 15 -0,08 0,10 40,82% 1,46%
20 0,04 0,12 75,14% 0,41% 20 -0,04 0,09 66,43% 0,40%
25 0,07 0,07 32,91% 3,81% 25 -0,14 0,07 6,20% 7,22%
30 0,04 0,08 60,26% 1,10% 30 -0,18 0,11 10,02% 5,65%
35 -0,09 0,08 26,54% 4,94% 35 -0,20 0,11 7,34% 6,66%
40 -0,11 0,10 27,70% 4,71% 40 -0,16 0,10 11,18% 5,29%
45 0,01 0,10 93,21% 0,03% 45 -0,08 0,08 32,85% 2,03%
50 0,02 0,09 83,79% 0,17% 50 0,11 0,07 9,90% 5,69%
55 -0,11 0,08 18,78% 6,83% 55 -0,03 0,10 73,47% 0,25%
























-1 1 0 -1 1 0 0 1 -1 0 -1 0 1 0
-1 1 0 -1 1 0 0 1 -1 0 -1 0 1 0
1 1 1 -1 0 0 0 1 -1 0 -1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 0 -1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 1 0 1 0 1 0
-1 1 0 -1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 -1 0 -1 0 1 0 1 1 1 -1 0 0 0
-1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 0 1 -1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 0 -1 0 1 0
1 -1 0 1 1 0 0 -1 1 0 -1 1 0 0
1 -1 0 1 1 0 0 1 -1 0 1 1 0 0
1 -1 0 -1 0 1 0 1 -1 0 -1 0 1 0
% correct 7 % correct 71,43% 50,00% 57,14% -1 1 0 -1 1 0 0
-1 1 0 -1 1 0 0
1 -1 0 1 1 0 0
-1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1
-1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 -1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 -1 0 0 0
1 -1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
6 % correct 56,52% 52,17% 66,67%
S&P Trasuries
Thr ES TY
0,09 78,57% 52,17%
0,1 71,43% 56,52%
0,11 71,43% 60,87%
0,12 71,43% 56,52%
0,13 71,43% 56,52%
0,14 71,43% 47,83%
0,15 57,14% 43,48%
